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recited at special, mainly ritual, occasions and 
were believed to be vital for the efficacy of those 
rites. The belief in the efficacy of mantras had a 
determining effect on the Brahmans’ attitude 
toward language.
The language of the Brahmanical mantras was 
Sanskrit. Modern linguists may be tempted to 
point out that the language of many of the vedic 
mantras is an older form or even a predecessor of 
classical Sanskrit, which they may give a different 
name – for example, “Vedic” or “Old Indo-Aryan”; 
for the Brahmanical tradition, the Vedic language 
and classical Sanskrit were one and the same lan-
guage, even though the Sanskrit of the Veda 
admittedly often used words and grammatical 
forms that were not commonly used in classical 
Sanskrit.
This conviction that Vedic and classical San-
skrit were one and the same language was impor-
tant for the Brahmans. It allowed them to think of 
this language as unchangeable and even as eternal 
and without beginning. Indeed, in postvedic 
times, the vedic corpus itself came to be looked 
upon as eternal and beginningless. This raised 
questions that will be discussed below.
At this point I will consider two consequences 
of the belief in the efficacy of mantras. This belief 
was particularly important for Brahmans, for their 
livelihood depended on it. Brahmans owed 
their special position in society primarily to their 
knowledge of the Veda: they could recite portions 
of it and use its mantras at appropriate occasions. 
But to be efficacious, these mantras had to be 
recited in a phonologically correct manner. One 
of the consequences of the belief in the efficacy of 
mantras was therefore that major attempts were 
made to describe the phonology of those mantras, 
and secondarily of Sanskrit in general. A rich lit-
erature on the phonology of Sanskrit arose, much 
of which has survived until today (Deshpande, 
1997, 31ff.; Scharfe, 1977, chs. 5, 7).
There was a second consequence of the belief in 
the efficacy of mantras, less immediately visible in 
the form of a surviving literature, but equally 
influential. The efficacy of Sanskrit mantras 
showed, at least to the Brahmans, that Sanskrit, 
their eternal language, was very close to objective 
reality. Sanskrit mantras could have an effect on 
The role of language in Indian philosophy is great, 
and indeed, much of this philosophy remains 
unintelligible without an awareness of the role 
that language plays in it. It can reasonably be 
maintained that an important part of Indian phi-
losophy is philosophy of language, to be under-
stood in the double sense of “philosophy inspired 
by language” and “reasoned inquiry into lan-
guage.” An exclusive concentration on the latter of 
these two, however, would not do full justice to the 
role of language in Indian philosophy. What is 
more, such a presentation would risk leaving out 
essential elements and remaining, to at least some 
extent, unintelligible. This article will therefore 
deal with both these aspects.
The point of departure is, and has to be, that the 
main actors in Indian philosophy held a number 
of views about language, which they considered 
either self-evident or too deeply anchored in their 
worldviews to allow for critical discussion. These 
views were therefore not normally objects of, but 
rather starting points for, inquiry.
These main actors were for a long time pri-
marily Brahmans and Buddhists. Brahmans and 
Buddhists did not share the same views about 
language, and indeed, their positions were often 
radically opposed to each other. In spite of these 
divergences, a remarkable convergence took place 
in the course of time, which led to a situation in 
which Brahmans and Buddhists agreed on a num-
ber of far-from-obvious points. In order to under-
stand this convergence, it will be necessary to 
discuss the different starting points and early 
developments of Brahmanical and Buddhist 
thought (see also → Hinduism and Buddhism).
Brahmanical Presuppositions and 
the Birth of Sanskrit Linguistics  
Scholars are well informed about religious con-
ceptions that were prevalent in Brahmanism at an 
early age, because this tradition has preserved for 
us a corpus of texts, at least part of which goes 
back to a time before any script was used in the 
Indian subcontinent. This corpus of texts, collec-
tively known as the → Veda, consists in part of sac-
rificial formulas, or → mantras. Mantras had to be 
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the objective world because a close link connected 
Sanskrit with that objective world. Sanskrit distin-
guished itself in this regard from the dialects spo-
ken by less eminent people. These dialects from 
our point of view were languages in their own 
right, and for the Brahmans no more than corrup-
tions of the only real language, Sanskrit. No such 
thing as historical linguistics could therefore exist 
from the Brahmanical point of view. The one real 
language, Sanskrit, did not change and had not 
changed from beginningless time. All other lan-
guages were not real languages but corruptions 
due to people too lazy or ignorant to learn the one 
real language.
The conviction that Sanskrit is close to reality is 
central to Brahmanical thought. It finds expres-
sion in various ways. Most notable among these is 
the belief that the form of a word tells us some-
thing about the object it designates. This belief is 
behind the numerous semantic etymologies found 
in Vedic literature, primarily in the Vedic texts 
called Brāhmaṇas (→ Vedas and Brāhmanạs). These 
etymologies have nothing whatsoever to do with 
the history of words, as in the case of historical 
etymologies studied nowadays by historical lin-
guists. Semantic etymologies are something dif-
ferent altogether. They start from the assumption 
that the similarity between words reveals a com-
mon feature shared by the things designated. 
Semantic etymologies assume, at least in vedic lit-
erature, the presence of hidden links between 
objects, links that can only be brought to light 
through the analysis of the words that designate 
them.
Interestingly, the belief in the significance of 
semantic etymologies gave rise to an early attempt 
at systematization known as nirukta, “etymology.” 
Its classical treatise, also called Nirukta, was com-
posed by a certain Yāska, who must have lived 
after Pāṇini but before Patañjali (see below), and 
therefore in or around the 3rd century BCE. This 
discipline, considered a vedic auxiliary science 
(vedāṅga), attempted to formulate the rules that 
govern semantic etymologizing. One of its princi-
pal rules, unsurprisingly, is that in establishing 
links between different words, considerations of 
meaning have to play a central role.
It is against this same background that we have 
to understand the interest in Sanskrit morphology 
and linguistics in general that characterized the 
late vedic period. This interest culminated initially 
in the famous grammar of Pān ̣ini (4th cent. BCE), 
which itself became the starting point for an 
extensive grammatical literature that consisted 
partly in commentaries on Pāṇini’s text, the 
Asṭạ̄dhyāyī, and partly in independent treatises 
that were yet profoundly influenced by Pān ̣ini’s 
grammar (Bronkhorst, 1981; see also → language 
and linguistics).
We will see below that the beliefs about the 
Sanskrit language just described came to exert 
an influence on Brahmanical philosophy. These 
beliefs themselves did not yet amount to a 
philosophical position, but they shaped future 
thinking.
Some scholars have made a somewhat different 
claim. They have drawn attention to the central 
significance of language study in Indian culture, 
and on the sophisticated way in which the gram-
marian Pāṇini in particular succeeded in dealing 
with complex linguistic issues. They have con-
cluded from this that Pān ̣ini’s grammar played a 
role in India comparable to Euclid’s geometry in 
Europe in becoming a methodical guide for more 
recent philosophers. In support of this claim, they 
can point out that the study of Pāṇini, or one of his 
successors, was fundamental in the classical for-
mation of scholars, so much so that all of them 
were acquainted with the grammatical method 
developed in these works. However, it is very hard, 
perhaps impossible, to give more substance to this 
claim. No one has yet been able to show in what 
way philosophical thinking followed a pattern 
derived from Pān ̣ini’s grammar. It is, however, 
beyond doubt that grammatical rules and argu-
ments are frequently cited in certain philosophi-
cal developments, some of which will be considered 
below. The influence of the brahmanical presup-
position as to the close connection between lan-
guage (i.e. Sanskrit) and reality will become clear 
as the discussion proceeds.
Buddhist Systematic Philosophy 
and the Role of Language  
Buddhist thinkers had no special attachment to 
the Sanskrit language, nor to any other language 
for that matter. They preserved what they believed 
were the words of the Buddha in different lan-
guages, often a language close to the one spoken in 
the region where they had settled. It is true that in 
the long run, some Buddhists came to think that 
the language in which they preserved the words 
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of the Buddha was the language in which the 
Buddha had preached. Some went further and 
claimed, no doubt under Brahmanical influence, 
that the language of their canon was the original 
language from which all other languages derived; 
this happened in the case of Pali, a language that 
the Buddhists concerned call Magadhi, namely, 
the language of Magadha, the region where the 
Buddha had preached. Brahmanical influence 
took a different shape in northern India, where the 
Buddhists, having preserved the Buddha word in 
local languages for half a millennium, changed 
over to Sanskrit and even came to believe that the 
ancient dialect in which some of their texts had 
been preserved was a form of vedic Sanskrit 
(Bronkhorst, 1993).
But whatever the language they used for 
religious purposes, the Buddhists were not, at 
least not initially, inclined to believe that any of 
these languages – or any other language for that 
matter – had a particularly close connection with 
reality. However, developments now to be sketched 
led to a situation where a number of Buddhists 
came to believe that there was a close connection 
between language and our experience of the 
world.
This connection with language was initially not 
obvious in the philosophical developments that 
the Buddhist school, called Sarvāstivāda, in north-
western India underwent during the final centu-
ries preceding the Common Era. For reasons 
that may be connected with the Hellenistic sur-
roundings in which they found themselves, these 
Buddhists made an attempt to systematize the 
teachings they had inherited, ultimately from the 
Buddha, they thought. These inherited teachings 
contained lists of items that had been extracted 
from the sermons of the Buddha. These items 
frequently referred to mental states, some others 
to physical elements. The name that came to 
be used for these items was → dharma, and the 
Buddhists of northwestern India developed the 
idea that these dharmas are the ultimate constitu-
ent elements of human beings, and by extension of 
everything else as well. For various reasons, these 
Buddhists also concluded that the dharmas must 
be momentary. On top of this, they stated that 
composite objects have no separate existence. In 
other words, a person is nothing but a collection 
and sequence of a large number of small and 
momentary entities; beside these numerous enti-
ties, there is nothing that one might call a person. 
The same applies by extension to macrocosmic 
objects in the external world: for example, there is 
no such thing as a chariot; there is only this vast 
sum of momentary constituent elements (Bronk-
horst, 2009, 55ff.).
This remarkable vision of the world has but lit-
tle in common with the original teaching of the 
Buddha, and the Buddhists of northwestern India 
had some difficulty anchoring it in the inherited 
Buddha words. However, as a philosophy, this 
vision came to flourish and exert a determining 
influence on most of the subsequent philosophi-
cal developments in Indian Buddhism. My ques-
tion is: What has this vision to do with the relation 
between language and reality?
This relation enters into the picture in a manner 
that can be usefully illustrated with the example of 
a chariot. We see and believe in the existence of a 
chariot, when in reality there is no such thing. 
How are we misled into entertaining such an 
incorrect idea? As a result of language. We believe 
there is a chariot, because there is the word “char-
iot.” The same applies to all the numerous other 
things we believe populate the world. In reality, 
they do no such thing, but we are tricked by the 
language we speak.
Two observations have to be made at this 
point. The relation postulated by these Buddhists 
between language and experience does not con-
cern reality as it really is. In deepest reality there 
are only vast numbers of momentary dharmas, as 
we have seen. The experience, whose parts corre-
spond to the words of language, is not a reliable 
representation of reality. In other words, from this 
Buddhist perspective, language is not closely 
related to reality. Quite on the contrary, language 
tricks us into believing in a world that is ultimately 
not real. The parts of language that do the tricking 
are its words. Chariots, persons, and so many 
other things are ultimately unreal, but are believed 
to be real because of the words that supposedly 
designate them.
The systematizations of the Sarvāstivāda school 
of Buddhism appear to be the first manifestations 
of systematic philosophy on the Indian subconti-
nent. They were not primarily concerned with 
language, yet language played an important role in 
them, as we have seen. The words of language are 
responsible for the fact that we believe, incorrectly, 
that we live in a world in which there are chariots, 
persons, and other such things. However, this 
vision of the Sarvāstivādins had to face an obvious 
difficulty. Words, like everything else, are them-
selves accumulations – most specifically, succes-
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sions – of dharmas. As such, they have no existence 
of their own, like all other accumulations of 
dharmas. This is problematic in that our incorrect 
beliefs in objects, such as chariots and persons, 
depend on words. If there are no words, what then 
is responsible for our mistaken conceptions?
It seems that the early Sarvāstivādins experi-
enced this as a problem. This we may conclude 
from the fact that they included among their lists 
of existing dharmas a number of items that cor-
respond to words and sentences. In other words, 
they postulated, beside the succession of auditory 
and other elements that make up the word “chariot,” 
the existence of a momentary dharma that some-
how represents the whole word “chariot.” This 
went of course against their general principle of 
not recognizing the existence of wholes, but 
strictly speaking they managed to avoid this 
inconsistency. The “wholes” postulated in the case 
of words (and sentences) were, strictly speaking, 
not wholes, but entities (dharmas) in their own 
right, which somehow accompanied the succes-
sion of auditory elements that gave expression to 
that meaning. In this complicated way, the 
Sarvāstivādins had again words, and they could 
again claim that our illusion concerning the world 
was due to these words. These linguistic dharmas 
of the Sarvāstivādins might be looked upon as an 
idiosyncrasy of the philosophy of these Buddhists 
without deeper significance. Such a conclusion 
would not be justified, if for no other reason than 
that more recent brahmanical thinkers happily 
drew inspiration from these Sarvāstivāda inven-
tions in order to deal with problems they had to 
face (Bronkhorst, 1987, ch. 3/7).
Reality as Language Incorporated
The Sarvāstivāda philosophy constituted a chal-
lenge that Brahmanical thinkers could not leave 
unanswered. Buddhism possessed in this philoso-
phy a coherent and well-thought-out system of 
thought, at a time when Brahmanism had nothing 
of the sort. It appears that Brahmanism had to 
come up with something comparable, so as to be 
able to defend itself in the public debates that 
sometimes took place at the royal courts. The out-
come of such debates could be more than aca-
demic and might affect the court’s willingness to 
support one group rather than another (Bronk-
horst, 2007).
In this situation Brahmanism developed two 
ontologies of its own. The one that is most inter-
esting in the present context is called → Vaiśesịka. 
It is most interesting in that it takes over the 
Sarvāstivāda idea that the world of our experience 
has a close connection with the words of language, 
but adjusted to its own Brahmanical presupposi-
tions. In Vaiśesịka the world of our experience 
coincides with the real world, and the only lan-
guage that is taken into consideration is Sanskrit. 
For Vaiśesịka, then, language is not a source of 
confusion that makes us believe in the external 
reality of a world that does not in that form exist, 
as it is for Sarvāstivāda. Quite on the contrary, for 
Vaiśesịka language (i.e. the Sanskrit language) is a 
source of information about the real world. If we 
wish to develop an ontological scheme, namely, a 
scheme of what there is, the Sanskrit language is 
the means par excellence to find it.
This fundamental conviction of the Vaiśesịkas 
finds expression in their philosophy. Vaiśesịka 
claims that all things (artha) in the world fall into 
three categories: substances, actions, and quali-
ties. These three categories correspond to the three 
main types of words already distinguished by the 
grammarian Patañjali (2nd cent. BCE): nouns, 
verbs, and adjectives. In order to make this onto-
logical scheme coherent, various Vaiśesịkas added 
a number of further categories, arriving at a vary-
ing total of six, seven, ten, or even more. However, 
even in their own understanding of their system, 
these further categories were add-ons.
The three main categories had subdivisions. 
The fundamental rule followed to find those sub-
divisions was that they had to correspond to 
words. The list of substances illustrates this par-
ticularly well: it corresponds by and large to the 
nouns of the Sanskrit language. The list of quali-
ties raises more difficult issues, for they are not all 
referred to by adjectives or other words; some of 
them, in particular, are designated by nouns. 
Questions about their existence are resolved by 
considering language use. The quality “number” 
must exist, because expressions such as “one pot,” 
“two pots,” and so on are common usage. The exis-
tence of the quality “dimension” (pramānạ) is 
shown by the use of the word “measure” (māna). 
There are further examples of this kind in the 
classical surviving standard work of Vaiśesịka, 
the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśasta (or 
Praśastapāda, c. 6th cent. CE). Vaiśesịka is in this 
way not so much a philosophy of language, as it is 
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a philosophy inspired by language, or rather: a phi-
losophy inspired by certain beliefs about the San-
skrit language (Bronkhorst, 1992).
Vaiśesịka ontology became preponderant in 
Brahmanism, especially in those schools of 
philosophy that developed ideas on language 
(→ Mīmāṃsā, → Nyāya, → Bhartrḥari). The other 
main early Brahmanical ontology, → Sāṃkhya, 
was not inspired by conceptions about language in 
the way Vaiśesịka was. This does not mean that it 
denied the close connection between language 
and reality. This will become clear in the discus-
sion below of the “linguistic crisis” that hit all 
Indian schools of philosophy – Brahmanical, Bud-
dhist, and even Jain – in the early centuries of the 
Common Era. 
The Word as Source of Knowledge  
Before discussing the “linguistic crisis,” we have to 
pay attention to another important development 
in Brahmanism that shaped the way it came to 
think about language: the interpretation of the 
Veda, known as Mīmāṃsā, whose main classical 
text is the commentary of Śabara (c. 5th cent. CE). 
Mīmāṃsā did not initially present itself as a school 
of philosophy, but as a school of Vedic hermeneu-
tics. Recall that Brahmanism had preserved an 
enormous corpus of literature, the Veda, at least in 
part, in the form of memorized texts. The vedic 
corpus contains mantras, as we have seen. It 
also contains texts globally referred to by the 
Mīmāṃsakas as Brāhmanạs: texts in prose related 
to the solemn vedic sacrifices. The Mīmāṃsakas 
were primarily interested in these Brāhmanạs, in 
which they expected to find matter useful or 
essential for the performance of those rites: injunc-
tions, information as to how to proceed and 
resolve apparent contradictions, and so on. They 
based their endeavors on some global assump-
tions about the Veda.
Most important among these assumptions was 
the claim that, like its language, the Veda itself, 
too, had no beginning: the Veda had always been 
there. This is of course only possible if the Veda 
had had no author. Being without author, the Veda 
is pure speech. This, from the Mīmāṃsā point of 
view, has important consequences. To understand 
these, consider first ordinary verbal communica-
tion between human beings. In ordinary verbal 
communication, there will be a speaker, a message 
expressed in language, and a listener. From the 
point of view of the listener, the received message 
will be reliable if two conditions are fulfilled: 
(1) the speaker is reliable, and (2) the message 
is correctly interpreted by the listener. In the 
case of the Veda, there is no speaker who formu-
lated the message initially. The chance that the 
Veda is used to mislead us is therefore excluded, 
and we must conclude that the message of the 
Veda is reliable, if only we know how to interpret 
the text correctly. This is the self-assigned task 
of Mīmāṃsā.
How does one interpret a text correctly? Once 
again, it is a matter of eliminating sources of 
error. The aim is to get as close as possible to 
the text, letting it speak for itself. Mīmāṃsā devel-
oped a whole list of principles of interpretation, 
which are in the end nothing but concrete mani-
festations of this general aim and are justified 
in this manner.
The belief that the Veda is without beginning 
has some consequences that have to be taken into 
consideration. Being without beginning, it is not 
posterior to any event that has ever taken place in 
the history of the world. Yet many vedic passages 
give the impression of relating such events, usu-
ally in the form of what we might call myths. None 
of these stories can be taken literally, because the 
Veda had already existed for an eternity at the time 
when these events supposedly took place. Stories 
and other references to historical events must 
therefore be interpreted differently. They must be 
read in context and have their place in the Veda in 
order to illustrate or lend support to vedic con-
tents that can be taken literally.
What are the vedic contents that should be 
taken literally? The process of elimination shows 
what they are. All statements of fact in the Veda 
must be interpreted metaphorically. This is partly 
due to the fact that the Veda cannot refer to his-
torical events, for the reason indicated above. 
However, other, nonhistorical, statements of fact 
contained in the Veda have another disadvantage. 
They might turn out to be in contradiction with 
our sense experience. This would be serious, for it 
would imply competition between two different 
means of knowledge: the vedic word, and percep-
tion. This difficulty does not exist in the case of 
injunctions. Injunctions tell us what we must do. 
No sense experience can ever be in conflict with 
an injunction, because perception informs us 
about states of affairs, not about obligations. With 
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regard to obligations, we have only one ultimate 
source of information, namely, the Veda. 
Mīmāṃsā arrives in this way at an interpreta-
tion of the Veda in which injunctions are central. 
They are what the Veda is all about. Everything 
else is to be interpreted in connection with those 
injunctions. In practice, the task is complex, but 
the theoretical basis is relatively simple and 
straightforward. In the end it amounts to this – 
that the word par excellence, the Veda itself, tells 
us what to do (Bronkhorst, 1997).
The second half of the 1st millennium CE saw 
the rise into prominence of a school that claimed 
to be no more than an improved version of classi-
cal Mīmāṃsā, but which opened up a path for 
completely new developments. This school – which 
referred to itself by various names, among them 
Śārīrakamīmāṃsā and Brahmamīmāṃsā, later also 
Uttaramīmāṃsā, and one of whose most impor-
tant early authors was → Śank̇ara (c. 700 CE) – came 
to be known by the name → Vedānta, or Vedāntism. 
It owes this name to the fact that the parts of the 
Veda known as vedānta (end of the Veda), better 
known as → Upanisạds, played an important role 
in its reflections. The importance of these portions 
of the Veda is, however, in a certain sense due to 
coincidence. The Brahmamīmāṃsā applied the 
same principles as classical Mīmāṃsā, but slightly 
improved them with the result that certain upani-
shadic statements gained center stage. Recall that 
classical Mīmāṃsā had maintained that only in 
the case of injunctions can we be sure that there 
will be no conflict with other means of knowledge. 
The Vedāntists added vedic statements that teach 
knowledge about → brahman; these vedic state-
ments happen to occur in the Upanisạds. They 
argued that knowledge about brahman can only 
be obtained from these vedic statements, not by 
any other means of knowledge. Since no conflict 
between different means of knowledge is therefore 
possible, these statements have to be taken liter-
ally (Bronkhorst, 2007).
The Nyāya school of thought was willing to 
agree with Mīmāṃsā in its claim that the word – 
and especially the linguistic expressions that are 
found in the Veda – is a reliable source of knowl-
edge. Unfortunately, and for reasons that will be 
discussed below, it adopted the position that the 
relation between words and things was conven-
tional. For them, therefore, the first of the two 
conditions specified above (a received message is 
reliable if the speaker is reliable and the message is 
correctly interpreted by the listener) retains its 
pertinence even in the case of the Veda. Unlike the 
Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas had to argue that the 
Veda had a trustworthy author, and indeed that 
the reliability of the Veda depended on the trust-
worthiness of that author. In an important sense, 
they had to admit that the reliability of the Veda 
depends on the same factors that make an ordi-
nary statement reliable, that is, the trustworthi-
ness of the speaker. They solved this problem by 
attributing the Veda to the most reliable person 
there is: God himself. This did not change the fact 
that their position – to the extent that the word 
(namely, linguistic utterances) is a reliable source 
of knowledge – was bound hands and feet by the 
supplementary requirement that the speaker, who 
uttered these words, is himself reliable (NyāS. and 
NyāBh. 2.1.50–67; trans. Jha, 1939).
We saw in the preceding section that the 
Vaiśesịka ontology, too, is ultimately based on the 
word as source of knowledge. The situation here is 
nonetheless different from the one described in 
connection with Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya. There (in 
Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya) I talked about the reliability 
of certain linguistic utterances: primarily those 
contained in the Veda, further those pronounced 
by reliable speakers. In the case of Vaiśesịka, how-
ever, I considered the relationship between the 
structure of reality and the structure of the 
Sanskrit language; the Veda or other reliable state-
ments did not play a role here. Interestingly, 
some Buddhist thinkers, most notably Dignāga 
(6th cent. CE), came to adopt an ontological posi-
tion similar to that of Vaiśesịka, ultimately for 
almost the same reason. Dignāga could not, of 
course, claim that language would tell us some-
thing about the world as it really is, for he, like 
most other Buddhists, thought that language is 
rather the source of our mistaken ideas about real-
ity. However, language, being the reason why we 
experience the world the way we do, is capable of 
providing us with information about the world 
of our experience. In order to find out more 
about this, Dignāga undertook an analysis of 
the relationship between words and things, which 
I will discuss below. Here it must suffice to observe 
that he arrived at an ontological scheme similar 
to that of Vaiśesịka, be it that in his case this 
ontological scheme was limited to the aspect of 
reality (ultimately unreality) ruled by language 
(Katsura, 1979).
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The Linguistic Crisis  
We have seen that a convergence between Brah-
manism and Buddhism took place. Both Brah-
mans and Buddhists had come to believe that 
there is a close link between language and the 
world of our experience. This shared position 
hides some profound differences, to be sure. For 
Brahmans, only Sanskrit counted as language; the 
Buddhists imposed no such limitation. Second, 
the world of our experience was, for the Brah-
mans, the world as it really is, the real world. The 
Buddhists, however, admitted a close correspon-
dence between language and reality only for the 
false reality that we believe we inhabit, but that has 
no ultimate reality at all. In spite of these differ-
ences, the points in common between Brahmans 
and Buddhists were responsible for a certain 
development in Indian philosophy, which affected 
them both.
This development is likely to have begun within 
Buddhism, and it is possible, though not certain, 
that Nāgārjuna (2nd cent. CE) was responsible for 
it. Buddhist philosophers maintained that the 
world of our experience is not real. They had made 
this the basis of their philosophies, but they had 
never been able to prove it in an objectively con-
vincing manner. This changed when people started 
paying attention to the relationship, not just 
between words and things, but also between state-
ments and what they signify. It was believed that 
statements describe situations that consist of 
the things denoted by the constituent words of the 
statement. Most ordinary statements can be 
thought to confirm this belief. The statement “the 
book lies on the table” consists of three words 
in Sanskrit and describes a situation constituted 
of three “things”: the book, the table, and the activ-
ity of lying. Most Indian thinkers looked upon 
statement in this manner, thus accepting, though 
often only implicitly, the “correspondence princi-
ple”: the words of a statement refer to the “things” 
that constitute the situation described by that 
statement.
A problem arises in the case of declarative state-
ments that describe a situation in which some-
thing is produced or comes into being. The 
situation described by “the potter makes a pot” 
contains a potter and the act of making, but no 
pot. Most Indian philosophers considered this 
problematic. What is more, many were willing to 
concede that this problem tells us something 
important about the nature of the world.
The Buddhist Nāgārjuna used this problem in a 
variety of ways to show that something is funda-
mentally amiss. Many of his arguments are vari-
ants of the following question: If there is something 
that is produced, what is the need of producing it? 
If there is not, how can it be produced?
Identifying the problem is not the same as offer-
ing a solution to it. We will see that different think-
ers came up with different solutions. Nāgārjuna 
himself concluded that difficulties of this kind 
show that nothing really exists: everything is 
empty (śūnya). His philosophy is for this reason 
frequently referred to as śūnyavāda (doctrine 
according to which the world is empty of essence), 
beside its other name, Madhyamaka.
As stated above, there is no compelling reason 
to agree with Nāgārjuna’s conclusion, even if one 
accepts that statements like “the potter makes a 
pot” represent a major difficulty. Brahmanical 
thinkers in particular would hesitate to admit that 
nothing really exists. This position was close to the 
Sarvāstivāda Buddhist belief according to which 
the world of our experience has no more than con-
ventional reality. Brahmanism was not ready to 
follow Buddhist thinkers in this regard. A rela-
tively straightforward way out was to claim that 
the pot in “the potter makes a pot” is somehow 
present in the situation described. Since the potter 
who makes a pot is working with clay, one only 
had to assume that the pot was in some form or 
other already present in the clay. This position 
became known as the satkāryavāda (doctrine 
according to which the effect [kārya, i.e. the pot, in 
our example] is already present [sat] in its cause 
[the clay, in our example]). The Sāṃkhya philoso-
phy adopted this solution. This, however, forced it 
to introduce some important changes into its sys-
tem. Indeed, what does it mean that the pot is 
already present in the clay? This claim only makes 
sense if clay is considered to be the essential fea-
ture of a pot. Everything else – its shape, its color, 
and other characteristics – has to be looked upon 
as secondary. Only thus can one maintain that 
what is truly essential to the pot, namely, its sub-
stance, is already there before the potter has fin-
ished his job. However, Sāṃkhya had thus far 
believed that substances are no more than accu-
mulations of qualities. This early position now had 
to be abandoned. This was done very thoroughly, 
so much so that one finds no trace of it in surviv-
ing Sāṃkhya texts. The texts by critics of the 
Sāṃkhya system, however, could not be so easily 
suppressed or “forgotten.” These texts belonging 
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to other philosophical schools constitute, there-
fore, our most important source of information 
about the early history of Sāṃkhya, before the lin-
guistic crisis obliged it to accept the satkāryavāda 
and introduce the modifications required by this 
new doctrine.
Jain philosophers followed a similar yet differ-
ent way to solve the problem, adopting the so-
called anekāntavāda (doctrine according to which 
it is one way in one respect, different in other 
respects). With regard to the pot, this means that, 
from the perspective of substance, clay and pot are 
the same; from the perspective of shape, they are 
different. This was considered sufficient to account 
for sentences like “the potter makes a pot,” for 
from the perspective of its substance, the pot is 
already there while the potter does his job.
The one school of philosophy that was not 
deeply affected by the linguistic crisis was 
Sarvāstivāda Buddhism. “Sarvāstivāda” means 
“doctrine according to which everything, namely 
past and future objects, exist.” The school had 
adopted this doctrine for reasons that have noth-
ing to do with language, but once adopted, this 
doctrine came in quite handy in the new situation. 
These Buddhists believed that future pots exist 
as much as present and indeed past pots. In the 
statement “the potter makes a pot,” there is there-
fore a pot (a future pot) in the situation described. 
Unlike most other philosophers of their day, the 
Sarvāstivādins thus survived the linguistic crisis 
undamaged.
Nāgārjuna had drawn the radical conclusion 
that nothing exists. Others, most notably the mys-
terious author Gauḍapāda, drew the equally dar-
ing conclusion that nothing can come into being. 
His was the ajātivāda (the doctrine according 
to which nothing is produced). Gauḍapāda came 
to be claimed by Advaita Vedānta (Gauḍapāda 
came to be looked upon as the teacher of the 
teacher of the famous Śaṅkara), but parts of 
the text attributed to him (the Āgamaśāstra or 
Gauḍapādakārikā) are recognizably Buddhist.
It will be clear from what precedes that the 
linguistic crisis was responsible for many of the 
vādas (doctrines) that are characteristic of various 
Indian philosophies: satkāryavāda, śūnyavāda, 
anekāntavāda, ajātivāda, and to some extent even 
sarvāstivāda. Its impact, however, went further. 
Some schools refused to adopt any of the options 
so far considered and decided to draw conclusions 
that were not of an ontological nature, but were 
rather based on a reflection of the way words 
denote their objects. The problem so far consid-
ered depends vitally on the assumption that the 
word “pot” in “the potter makes a pot” refers to 
an individual object in the situation described. 
The Nyāya-Vaiśesịka school of thought, having 
explored other solutions, ended up pointing out 
that the word “pot” in that sentence does not have 
to refer to an individual object, but rather (more 
correctly, also) to the universal that inheres in all 
pots. Indeed, all pots share that name because they 
have something in common, namely, a shared 
universal. Since the pot universal inheres in all 
pots – past, present, and future – it cannot but be 
eternal. Being eternal, it is always there, also in the 
situation described by “the potter makes a pot.” 
The new reflection about the way words denote 
things solved the problem (there was now some-
thing corresponding to “pot” in “the potter makes 
a pot”), and no further ontological conclusions 
needed to be drawn. In particular, it was not nec-
essary to claim that the effect (the pot) exists 
already in its cause (the clay) before it is produced. 
In Nyāya-Vaiśesịka, therefore, there was no place 
for satkāryavāda, and their solution came to be 
known by the name asatkāryavāda (the doctrine 
according to which the effect is not already pres-
ent in its cause).
It is noteworthy that the two principal early 
Brahmanical positions, satkāryavāda and asatkār-
yavāda, can be read as adaptations of two posi-
tions proposed in Patañjali’s Mahābhāsỵa, a major 
grammatical work in the Pān ̣ini’s tradition, dating 
from the middle of the 2nd century BCE, long 
before the linguistic crisis made itself felt. Patañ-
jali discussed the question of the object denoted 
by a word. According to Patañjali, this object must 
be eternal, and he proposed two conceivable can-
didates: (1) words refer to forms, and (2) words 
refer to substances. In the first case, forms must be 
thought of as eternal, contrary to individuals, 
which are not. In the second case, substances are 
eternal. (The discussion becomes somewhat com-
plicated on account of the fact that both “individ-
ual” and “substance” translate the same Sanskrit 
word dravya.) Different authorities held different 
positions in this matter; Patañjali himself thought 
that words signify both form and dravya. It is easy 
to see that the position according to which words 
refer to eternal substances is close to the 
satkāryavāda of the Sāṃkhyas. It is equally obvi-
ous that the alternative position, according to 
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which words refer to eternal forms, is close to 
the one in which words refer to eternal universals, 
that is, the asatkāryavāda. These positions drew, 
therefore, inspiration from an old and venerable 
grammatical treatise, so as to arrive at a solution 
to a problem that had not yet been known to 
Patañjali.
The Nyāya school was not the only one to pro-
pose a semantic solution to the problem of the 
production of things. The Buddhist thinker 
Dignāga, mentioned earlier, came up with a solu-
tion of his own, which, however, shared with 
Nyāya the conviction that words do not refer to 
individuals. However, Dignāga had no place for 
universals in his ontology, so he could not simply 
copy the Naiyāyikas’ solution. The solution he 
proposed was inspired by his work in logical 
deduction.
Note, to begin with, that Dignāga sharply dis-
tinguishes between the world ruled by language, 
and the deeper reality that hides behind it. In his 
opinion, words do not apply to this deeper reality, 
which is the object of perception alone. Percep-
tion bears on the particular (svalaksạṇa), language 
on the general (sāmānyalaksạṇa). Ultimately, the 
objects of our perception are real, while the realm 
covered by language is not.
In the realm of language, words refer to their 
objects by way of exclusion (apoha): a word, say, 
“pot,” excludes everything that is not a pot. The 
word “pot” applies in this way to the pot, but does 
not denote it.
Dignāga assimilated this process of referring to 
the process of inference. He was among the first to 
have realized that an inference of the type “if there 
is smoke on the mountain, then there is fire” is 
logically equivalent to “if there is no fire on the 
mountain, then there is no smoke”; if B follows 
from A, not-A follows from not-B, and vice versa. 
Analogous applies in the case of referring: saying 
that all pots, and only those are referred to by the 
word “pot,” is equivalent to saying that all things 
that are not pots are not referred to by this word. 
Dignāga arrives in this way at an understanding of 
referring that does not postulate the existence of 
universals, or of a special link between words and 
individuals. The statement “the potter makes a 
pot” is no longer problematic for him, for there is 
no longer supposed to be a specific link between 
the word “pot” in this statement and the individ-
ual pot the potter is making (Bronkhorst, 1999).
Bhartr ̣hari  
Bhartrḥari is often referred to as a “philosopher of 
grammar.” He certainly was a grammarian, and he 
was also a philosopher. He used grammatical 
notions in his philosophy, but it is open to debate 
whether he was a philosopher of grammar.
Consider his ontological position in broadest 
outline. For Bhartṛhari, the totality of all that exists 
is the one encompassing reality, which he some-
times refers to as brahman. Though one and indi-
visible, this totality is yet divided in accordance 
with the words of language. These divisions are, 
however, less real than the encompassing whole 
from which they originate.
So far, Bhartṛhari’s philosophy is Buddhist phi-
losophy turned on its head. In the Buddhist onto-
logical scheme that we have come to associate 
with the Sarvāstivādins and others, composite 
entities were less real than their ultimate compo-
nents; these composite entities owe their (relative) 
existence to the words of language. In Bhartṛhari’s 
philosophy, it is the other way round: composite 
entities are more real than their components, and 
these components owe their (relative) existence to 
the words of language.
Bhartrḥari illustrates his vision with a discus-
sion of linguistic entities. Pāṇini’s grammar divides 
words into smaller entities, such as stems and suf-
fixes. These smaller entities are the result of analy-
sis and are artificial, in the sense that they are less 
real than the words from which they are extracted. 
A grammarian different from Pān ̣ini might iden-
tify different stems and different suffixes. Here, 
then, we find that the composite whole, the word, 
is more real than the elements into which it has 
been analyzed. The same reasoning applies to sen-
tences and words. Words are extracted from sen-
tences, but sentences are more real than the words 
into which they are analyzed. One can continue 
this reasoning and discover that the only really 
existent linguistic entity is the Veda, this huge 
totality of sentences. All other linguistic units are 
less real.
The total, undivided Veda corresponds, in 
Bhartrḥari’s view, to the totality of all there is, 
which he sometimes calls brahman. The world of 
our experience corresponds to smaller linguistic 
units, and like those smaller linguistic units, it is 
less real (Bronkhorst, 1992).
This ontological scheme had for Bhartṛhari 
more than just philosophical significance. He 
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believed that its knowledge was vital for attaining 
the highest religious goal, liberation. Something 
similar had already been proposed by thinkers 
belonging to the Madhyamaka tradition, but 
Bhartrḥari gave it a completely Brahmanical and, 
what is more, grammatical twist. It is for this rea-
son that Bhartṛhari could seriously maintain that 
grammar was the door to liberation. This claim 
has puzzled modern interpreters, who have tended 
to understand it as metaphorical exaggeration. It 
is, however, possible to take Bhartṛhari seriously 
in this regard. Bhartṛhari literally believed that the 
study of grammar was the door to liberation, 
because grammar was the means par excellence to 
understand the fundamental scheme of the uni-
verse, in which composite entities are more real 
than their constituent parts. Grammar shows this 
in the realm of words (with their constituent stems 
and suffixes) and sentences (with their constituent 
words). Once properly extended, this scheme cov-
ers the whole universe with all it contains; know-
ing this was for Bhartṛhari an essential step toward 
the highest goal: the door to liberation (Bronk-
horst, 1995).
On a more day-to-day and linguistic level, 
Bhartrḥari owed his readers an explanation for his 
claim that words are more real than, and therefore 
different from, their constituents, and that sen-
tences are different from their constituent words. 
Are words, and sentences, not simple sequences 
of sounds? Bhartṛhari thought they were not. 
According to him, a word is a different entity from 
its constituent elements. That is to say, beside the 
sequence of sounds used to communicate, say, a 
word, there is an altogether different “thing” that 
is the word itself. Bhartṛhari sometimes uses 
the word sphotạ for this entity. He was not alto-
gether original in this regard, for we have seen 
that the Sarvāstivādins had introduced a small 
number of linguistic dharmas for the very same 
reason. Beside similarities, there is, however, a 
major difference: the linguistic dharmas of the 
Sarvāstivādins were momentary (like practically 
all other dharmas), while Bhartṛhari’s sphotạ is 
eternal. This may look like an important differ-
ence, but the two share an important feature: 
neither the linguistic dharmas of the Sarvāstivādins 
nor Bhartrḥari’s sphotạ correspond to the com-
mon-sense notion of word or sentence. Common-
sense words and sentences have a finite duration 
in time, corresponding to the time it takes to pro-
nounce them. Bhartṛhari’s sphotạ, like the linguis-
tic dharmas of the Sarvāstivādins, do not exist for 
that length of time: they exist either for much 
longer (Bhartrḥari’s sphotạ is eternal and has 
therefore no beginning or end in time), or for 
much shorter (the linguistic dharmas of the 
Sarvāstivādins are momentary).
It must here further be noted that, contrary to a 
widespread misunderstanding among modern 
scholars, Bhartṛhari’s sphotạ is not, or not primar-
ily, a semantic entity, a meaning bearer. This 
explains that Bhartṛhari can present a completely 
analogous reasoning to justify the existence of 
sphotạs corresponding to individual sounds, 
which have no meaning. The ontological problem 
is the same for sounds as for words: they are 
sequences of vibrations and would have no sepa-
rate existence but for the postulation that they 
exist as sphotạs. The confusion is due to the fact 
that more recent authors in the grammatical tradi-
tion, who were much more interested in semantics 
than in ontology, came to speak of the sphotạ as a 
meaning bearer (Bronkhorst, 2005).
Sentence Meaning  
In language, words and their constituent parts are 
joined into sentences. Sentences and their parts 
have meanings, but the relationship between the 
meaning of a sentence and the meanings of its 
constituent parts is not immediately obvious. Is 
the sentence meaning no more than the accumu-
lation of the meanings of its constituents? Or are 
there supplementary meanings that have been 
added to those word meanings? If so, which ones? 
Or should we rather look upon the sentence as an 
entity that is altogether different from its parts, 
with a meaning of its own that is quite indepen-
dent of the meanings of those parts? These issues 
attracted the attention of Brahmanical thinkers 
from an early date onward, and they came up with 
a variety of answers.
What seemed at first sight to be simplest solu-
tion was adopted by the school of Mīmāṃsā, asso-
ciated with the name of Prabhākara (c. 700 CE). 
This school maintained that a sentence expresses 
no more and no less than the accumulated mean-
ings of its words. The objection that the words in a 
sentence are functionally related to one another, 
so that the meaning of the sentence goes beyond 
the mere meanings of its words, is answered by 
the claim that individual words also express 
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all the others. This central semantic element they 
called bhāvanā (bringing into being). About this 
“bringing into being” we need to know its pur-
pose, the means by which the purpose is brought 
about, and how it is brought about. The simple 
injunction svargakāmo yajeta (he who desires 
heaven should sacrifice) thus gives expression to a 
bringing into being by means of a sacrifice, with 
heaven as its purpose. (The “how” is not further 
specified in this example; most vedic injunctions 
provide information about the kind of sacrifice to 
be performed.)
The Naiyāyikas felt that they could not agree 
with the Mīmāṃsā analysis of the sentence. 
Not only did they have a different view as to 
the independence of vedic statements (unlike the 
Mīmāṃsakas, they did not look upon these state-
ments as fully independent, but rather as utter-
ances of God), but they were also committed to an 
ontology in which substances play a central role. 
Indeed, of the three categories discussed earlier 
(substances, actions, and qualities), substances 
are central, for actions and qualities can only exist 
if they reside in substances: substances are quali-
fied by actions and qualities. A typical statement 
(such as “the blue bird flies”) indicates how a par-
ticular substance (the bird) is qualified by an 
action (it flies) and a quality (it is blue). The 
Naiyāyikas therefore proposed a hierarchy of 
meanings in which the subject of the sentence 
(typically a substance) is qualified by the other ele-
ments of the sentence.
The grammarians of the Pān ̣ini’s tradition were 
the last to join the debate. They felt that the analy-
ses provided by Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, 
which made abundant use of Pāṇini’s grammar, 
ignored the most important contribution that this 
grammar could make: its insistence that action is 
the central element of a sentence. The analysis 
proposed by these grammarians therefore put the 
action at the center of sentence analysis, action 
being the unit that is qualified by its other seman-
tic elements (Diaconescu, 2010; Tatacharya, vol. I, 
2005–2008)
The Meanings of Words and Their 
Parts  
As stated above, the interest in semantic questions 
grew over time, especially in the Brahmanical 
schools of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśesịka. This 
their relation to other words in the sentence 
(anvitābhidhāna); as a result the accumulated 
meanings of the words amount to the meaning of 
the sentence.
The Prābhākara school was alone in maintain-
ing this position. Prabhākara’s senior contempo-
rary, Kumārila Bhatṭạ, for example, observed that 
the primary meanings of words when joined up 
could not account for the sentence meaning; he 
and his followers, the so-called Bhātṭạ school of 
Mīmāṃsā, as well as other thinkers, rather held 
that secondary meanings for words in a sentence 
had to be postulated so as to account for their 
mutual relation in a sentence (abhidhānānvaya).
A third position preferred to look upon the sen-
tence as a separate entity that expressed its mean-
ing independently of the meanings of the words 
that seemed to constitute it. We have seen that 
Bhartrḥari in particular advocated the separate 
existence of the sentence. It is therefore not sur-
prising that those who followed him, primarily 
grammarians in the Pānịni’s tradition, also accepted 
the separate semantic role of the sentence.
All except the Prābhākaras were confronted 
with the need to understand how exactly the 
meanings of words and sentence are related to 
each other. This need was particularly acute in the 
reflections of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Vedic herme-
neuts who had come to the conclusion that injunc-
tions are the most essential part of the Veda, 
around which other vedic statements are to be 
interpreted. It is in this school that elaborate anal-
yses of the sentence meaning, in terms of its con-
stituent elements, began. Other thinkers, most 
notably those belonging to the Nyāya school 
(which had meanwhile absorbed the Vaiśesịka 
school), followed later. Later again the school of 
grammar that derived its inspiration from Pān ̣ini 
and Patañjali joined the debate. 
Concentrating on the Vedic injunctions, the 
Mīmāṃsakas had to determine which part of any 
particular injunction expresses the injunction 
itself and arrange all other grammatical units 
around this central element as qualifying it. They 
found that, in a statement like svargakāmo yajeta 
(he who desires heaven should sacrifice), the bare 
injunction (“should”) is expressed by the verbal 
ending (-ta). Specifications as to the details of the 
injunction have to be derived from the other parts 
of the sentence. The Mīmāṃsakas introduced in 
this manner a hierarchy of meanings, centered 
around the semantic element that is qualified by 
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Pān ̣ini’s grammar. Discussions about their mean-
ings took Pāṇini’s analysis as point of departure, 
but could deviate from it with respect to the pre-
cise meanings of those elements. Discussions 
about these meanings attracted a lot of attention 
in the more recent literature of the schools con-
cerned (Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, grammar), and we can 
only consider one example: the meaning of the 
verbal ending. In a simple sentence like caitraḥ 
odanam pacati (Caitra cooks rice), the verb is 
pacati (cooks), the verbal ending -ti (which cor-
responds to English “-s”). The grammarians, 
following Pān ̣ini, assigned the meaning “agent” to 
this ending. The Naiyāyikas, more inclined to ana-
lyze the sentence in terms of a subject (in this case 
the individual called Caitra) qualified by various 
features, assigned the meaning “activity” (kṛti) or 
“effort” ( yatna) to the verbal ending, so that they 
could paraphrase the sentence along the following 
lines: “Caitra is characterized by the activity, or 
effort, of cooking rice.” The Mīmāṃsakas, finally, 
wanted to push their bhāvanā (bringing into 
being) to the fore and assigned this meaning to the 
verbal ending. The inevitable result was that their 
analysis of the above sentence took something like 
the following shape: “The bringing into being 
whose agent is Caitra and which leads to the soft-
ening of rice.” Even this simple (and simplified) 
example will make clear that the discussion of the 
meaning of the individual grammatical elements 
cannot be separated from considerations as to the 
meaning of the sentence as a whole.
Language, Philosophy, and Science  
The preceding pages have shown that thought 
about language exerted a profound influence on 
Indian philosophy in most of its manifestations. 
This observation should not too easily be reduced 
to the statement that in India grammatical thought 
deeply influenced philosophical thought. This last 
statement is no doubt true to at least some extent, 
but risks at the same time to put the cart before the 
horse. Sanskrit grammatical thought was itself the 
outcome of ideas and presupposition about lan-
guage (and about Sanskrit in particular). It cannot 
be denied that those who wrote treatises about 
philosophy and science in classical India had 
received a thorough training in Sanskrit grammar, 
either Pāṇini’s grammar itself, or any of the later 
grammars that had been inspired by it. It is equally 
obvious that many of the discussions about the 
interest had old and venerable antecedents, to 
be sure. Pāṇini’s grammar assigned meanings to 
the different grammatical elements it introduced, 
most particularly suffixes and verbal roots. In spite 
of the holistic tendencies of authors like Bhartṛhari, 
or perhaps in part because of them, Indian think-
ers continued to show an interest in the meanings 
of words and, ultimately, of minimal grammatical 
elements. Their concern with the analysis of sen-
tence meaning only strengthened this interest, not 
least because certain ways of analyzing the sen-
tence depended on certain ways of understanding 
the meanings of its elements. I will consider exam-
ples below.
One issue that sparked opposition among 
thinkers in the Brahmanical tradition concerned 
the question as to whether the relation between 
words and their meanings is natural. For the 
Mīmāṃsakas there was no question: this relation 
is natural and without beginning. The Nyāya-
Vaiśesịka school adopted a different position, 
maintaining that it is conventional: at some time 
in the past, meanings had been assigned to words. 
Most of the surviving texts of the school add that 
this had been done by God, the creator of the pres-
ent universe. This postulated conventionality 
did not, at least not until a recent date, mean that 
these thinkers were willing to consider that people 
could follow their whims in assigning meanings 
to words. These thinkers, too, were Brahmans, 
and they, too, talked about the same fixed and 
unchangeable language as the Mīmāṃsakas, 
namely, Sanskrit. The conventionality they spoke 
about was related to the question of whether words 
had their meaning by nature, or rather had 
acquired it as a result of a decision, preferably one 
taken by God. Nyāya-Vaiśesịka opted for the sec-
ond alternative.
Whether or not the relation between a word 
and its meaning was natural or conventional, 
Brahmanical thinkers generally held that each 
word has one primary meaning; contextual fac-
tors may subsequently oblige an interpreter to 
resort to a secondary meaning. Considerations of 
this kind were central to the reflections of the 
Mīmāṃsakas in their attempts to find the correct 
interpretation of the Veda: these attempts can only 
bear fruit if one gets as close as possible to the text 
and lets it speak for itself; obviously the primary 
meanings of words are closer to the text than 
derived, secondary meanings.
The units of meaning smaller than words are 
the minimal grammatical elements known from 
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meanings of sentences, words, and their constitu-
ents, which I reviewed above, referred quite 
explicitly to Pāṇini’s grammar. The importance of 
this influence can yet be exaggerated.
This is what may have happened in the case of 
the claim (Ingalls, 1954; Staal, 1965/1988), accord-
ing to which Pāṇini’s grammar provided method-
ical guidelines to science and philosophy in 
India, the way Euclid did in the history of 
Western science and philosophy. There can be no 
doubt about the appeal of this claim, but little has 
been done to test it against the evidence. An inves-
tigation into the possible influence of Pān ̣ini’s 
grammar on Indian geometry has not yielded 
conclusive results. It seems therefore safer, for the 
time being, not to exaggerate the effect that Pāṇini’s 
grammar has had on philosophical and scientific 
thought in India. The effect exerted by notions 
about language in general, however, is clear and 
wide, as the preceding pages have indicated 
(Bronkhorst, 2001).
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